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Abstract 
 
This study examines corporate social performance (CSP) in firms that restate their financial 
statements and, using a match pair design, compares their performance to firms that do not 
restate their financial statements.  Utilizing a randomized block design (two years prior to the 
restatement and two years after the restatement) for a sample of 44 U.S. firms, we found that 
CSP Strengths, CSP Weaknesses, CSP People Strengths, and CSP People Weaknesses all in-
creased after restatement though weaknesses increased at a greater rate than strengths.  Addi-
tionally, using panel data and a match pair design we found, we found that restating firms had 
a greater increase in CSP Strengths, CSP Weaknesses, CSP Product Strengths, CSP People 
Strengths and a greater decrease in Total CSP People than non-restating firms after the restate-
ment period.  When comparing the relationships between CSP and financial performance (FP), 
we found that the positive relationship between ROA and CSP Strengths is greater for restate-
ment firms than non-restating firms.  In particular, we find that this positive relationship is a 
result of the People dimension of CSP, in particular CSP People Strengths. 
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CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORM-
ANCE AND THE ISSUE OF FINAN-
CIAL RESTATEMENTS   
 
The quality of financial reporting has 
come under increased scrutiny in recent 
years because of high-profile financial 
reporting failures, such as Enron and 
WorldCom, and the significant increase 
in the number of financial restatements.  
An October 2002 General Accounting 
Office (GAO) report documents that the 
number of financial restatements has 
increased 145 percent from 1997 to 2001 
and that publicly traded companies lost 
billions in market capitalization in the 
days and months following a restatement 
announcement.  The GAO report further 
concludes that the increase in restate-
ments has negatively impacted investor 
confidence.  For example, the GAO’s 
October 4, 2002 letter to Senator Paul 
Sarbanes states the following: 
 
“The growing number of restate-
ments and mounting questions 
about certain corporate account-
ing practices appear to have 
shaken investors’ confidence in 
our financial reporting system... 
empirical research studies and 
academic experts generally sug-
gest accounting issues have nega-
tively affected overall investor 
confidence and raised questions 
about the integrity of U.S. mar-
kets.” 
 
Lawsuits against firms resulted in nearly 
a 1% loss in market value (Bhagat et al., 
1998), in which an estimated one-third 
of this loss is attributed to harmed firm 
reputation (Karpoff and Lott, 1993).  
The problem does not end with the pas-
sage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) but 
its continuation has implication for lack 
of stakeholder confidence in financial 
markets (Donoher et al., 2007) as well as 
a firm’s corporate social performance 
(CSP).  According to Carroll (1979), 
CSP considers a variety of factors, in-
cluding discretionary responsibility to 
the community, economic responsibility 
to investors and consumers, ethical re-
sponsibilities to society and legal re-
sponsibility to the government or the 
law.  In this turbulent environment, these 
firms need to devise strategies that will 
enable them to survive and prosper in 
this environment in which stakeholders 
demand both financial performance (FP) 
and effective stakeholder responsiveness 
(Johnson and Greening, 1999).  These 
firms may need to keep in mind CSP as 
they pursue superior performance 
through being responsive to the environ-
ment, maintaining product quality and 
being responsive to the communities in 
which it operates and the people it em-
ploys (Turban and Greening, 1997). 
 
Though research concerning the nature 
of the relationship between CSP and FP 
continues to be mixed (See Griffin and 
Mahon, 1997; Roman et al., 1999), a 
number of findings indicate a positive 
association (Worrell et al., 1991; Preston 
and O’Bannon, 1997; Frooman, 1997; 
Roman et al., 1999; Orlitzky and Benja-
min, 2001; Murphy, 2002; Simpson and 
Kohers, 2002).  Furthermore, most of 
these findings are derived from compa-
nies that are not experiencing financial 
reporting failures.  The objectives of this 
paper are twofold:  First, we address the 
question of whether firms that restate 
financial statements have different levels 
of CSP than non-restating firms.  Sec-
ond, we address the questions on 
whether the relationship between CSP 
and FP is different between restating 
firms and non-restating firms.  This re-
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search study will contribute to the ac-
counting research stream investigating 
financial restatements, as well as the 
ethics research of CSP, and extends the 
debate on the link between CSP and FP.  
The remainder of the paper is organized 
as follows.  First, we examine the back-
ground, theory and hypotheses.  Second, 
we explain our research methods and 
third, we present the results.  The final 
section includes our summary, discus-
sion and conclusions. 
 
 
BACKGROUND, THEORY AND 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Financial Reporting Failures 
 
Financial reporting failures include both 
frauds and restatements.  During the pe-
riod of 1987-1996, the SEC found that a 
majority of frauds involved financial 
statement fraud (Beasley et al., 1999).  
These frauds included sham sales, re-
cording conditional sales as finalized 
and recording revenues early.  Thus, for 
the purpose of this study, we examine 
only accounting restatements.  Restate-
ments are an admission that previously 
issued financial statements were not in 
accordance with GAAP (Palmrose and 
Scholz, 2004).  Early research focused 
on characteristics of restating firms.  For 
example, Kinney and McDaniel (1989) 
find restatement firms are smaller, less 
profitable, have higher debt, and are 
slower growing.  DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1991) find earnings overstatements are 
more likely for firms with diffuse own-
ership and lower growth in earnings, and 
less likely for firms with audit commit-
tees.   
 
Recent studies document significant 
negative economic consequences related 
to financial reporting failures.  Palmrose 
et al. (2004) find a mean abnormal re-
turn of -9.2% in the two-day window 
(day 0, 1) around a restatement an-
nouncement, with more negative returns 
for restatements involving fraud (-20%).  
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find the 
negative market reaction is greater for 
restatements of core earnings (i.e. pre-
tax earnings from primary operations) 
than for non-core earnings (i.e. all other 
earnings).  Anderson and Yohn (2002) 
document the long-term economic con-
sequences of restatements by finding 
average cumulative abnormal returns of 
-7.97% for the period from three days 
before the restatement announcement 
through three days after the restatement 
filing with the SEC.   
 
There are also legal consequences to a 
financial reporting failure.  In the Palm-
rose and Scholz (2004) study, 38 percent 
of the companies in their restatement 
sample subsequently faced civil litiga-
tion.  They found that companies with 
restatements of core earnings (primarily 
revenue restatements) and pervasive re-
statements (i.e. more than one account-
ing item restated) are more likely to be 
subject to litigation.   
 
A financial reporting failure also dam-
ages the reputation of the firm, auditors, 
management, and the board of directors.  
For example, Srinivasan (2005) found 
that outside board members experience 
significant reputational costs following 
accounting restatements.  Srinivasan 
finds significant turnover of board mem-
bers in the three years following the re-
statement, including director turnover 
for 48 percent of firms that restate earn-
ings downward.  The likelihood of direc-
tor turnover increases if the board mem-
ber is also on the audit committee.  The 
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study also finds outside directors lose 
positions on other boards following a 
restatement.   
 
Another study, Desai et al. (2006), ex-
amined the reputational penalties to 
managers of restating firms and found 
that 60% of restating firms experience 
management turnover in the two years 
following a restatement as compared 
with 35 percent for a control sample.  
An audit firm’s reputation can be dam-
aged by a financial reporting failure, as 
evidenced by the demise of Arthur An-
dersen.  Barton (2005) examines the de-
mand for auditor reputation by examin-
ing the client defections from Arthur 
Andersen.  Barton (2005) finds firms 
that are more visible in the capital mar-
kets switched sooner to another Big 5 
auditor, as they were concerned about 
their auditor’s reputation and the credi-
bility of their financial reporting. 
 
Accounting numbers used in contracts 
(e.g. compensation and debt contracts) 
must be verifiable for the contract to be 
enforceable in court (Watts, 2003).  
Based on prior literature, it is reasonable 
to assume that a financial reporting fail-
ure leads to greater uncertainty about the 
reliability and verifiability of the ac-
counting numbers used in contracts.  As 
a restatement casts doubt on the quality 
of the financial reports and increases the 
risk to the contracting parties, sharehold-
ers and lenders will demand an increased 
risk premium following a reporting fail-
ure.  For example, empirical studies find 
that frauds and accounting restatements 
lead to an increased cost of capital (e.g., 
Dechow et al., 1996; Hribar and Jenkins, 
2004).  Investors demand a higher rate 
of return to compensate for the per-
ceived riskiness of the firm due to less 
reliable accounting numbers following a 
financial reporting failure.   
As for debt contracts, Sengupta (1998) 
suggests that quality of financial report-
ing is likely used by lenders in calculat-
ing default risk.  Sengupta (1998) found 
that firms with high disclosure quality 
ratings from financial analysts are 
charged a lower cost of debt, and the 
importance of disclosure is greater when 
there is greater market uncertainty as 
measured by the variance of stock re-
turns.  Thus, lenders likely demand a 
higher risk premium following a report-
ing failure in part due to the perceived 
decrease in quality of the accounting 
reports.   
 
The risk premium demanded by share-
holders and debt holders also increases 
following a reporting failure because of 
the increased uncertainty about the fu-
ture profitability and economic prospects 
of restatement firms.  Palmrose et al. 
(2004) found a significant downward 
revision in earnings forecasts following 
restatements and a significant increase in 
analyst forecast dispersion (a proxy for 
uncertainty).  Hribar and Jenkins (2004) 
found accounting restatements lead to 
decreases in expected future earnings. 
 
In summary, restatements can have nu-
merous negative effects.  These include 
economic losses to investors; damage to 
the reputations of the firm, auditors, 
management, and the board of directors; 
an increase in the cost of capital; and a 
negative impact on future earnings 
power.   
 
CSP  and FP 
 
Research on the relationship between 
CSP and FP has resulted in positive 
(Wokutch and Spencer, 1987; McGuire 
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et al., 1988, 1990; Waddock and Graves, 
1997; Simpson and Kohers, 2002; Or-
litzky and Benjamin, 2001; Mahoney 
and Roberts, 2007; Hill et al., 2007), 
negative (Waddock and Graves, 1997, 
Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Patten, 
2002) and neutral results (Alexander and 
Buchholz, 1978; Aupperle et al., 1985; 
Ullman, 1985; Cochran and Wood, 
1984;  Shane and Spicer, 1983; Fauzi, 
forthcoming; Moore, 2001; Fauzi et al., 
2007).  The negative view on the rela-
tionship between CSP and FP argues 
that firms incur costs to improve social 
performance and by doing so, they re-
duce profits and shareholder wealth.  
The positive view argues that better CSP 
is viewed as positive by various stake-
holders, leading to improved FP (Jones, 
1995; Jones and Wicks, 1999).  Those 
who support the neutral relationship ar-
gue that the direct relationship between 
CSP and FP does not exists due to the 
complexity of the environment in which 
firms and society operate in (Mahoney 
and Roberts, 2007) 
 
The problem of measuring CSP is ar-
gued by Waddock and Graves (1997) as 
the primary reason for the conflicting 
results found regarding the relationship 
between CSP and FP.  Waddock and 
Graves (1997) found a positive relation-
ship between CSP and FP when using an 
improved measurement of CSP, the 
KLD index.  The KLD index provides 
access to a wide range of independent, 
consistently applied ratings of U.S. firms 
across a number of important social per-
formance attributes that were determined 
by a knowledgeable group of individuals 
not connected with the firms (Waddock 
and Graves, 1997).  KLD evaluates each 
company traded on the U. S. stock ex-
change over the dimensions of commu-
nity, corporate governance, diversity, 
employee relations, environment, human 
rights, and product.  The KLD index 
ratings are based upon data gathered 
from a broad range of sources; both in-
ternal and external to the firm (see Wad-
dock and Graves, 1995 for further de-
tails).  Subsequently, this multidimen-
sional index has been regarded as one of 
the best information sources available to 
researchers studying CSP (Hillman and 
Keim, 2001) and has been used in many 
subsequent studies (McGuire et al., 
2003; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Albin-
ger and Freeman, 2000, Greening and 
Turban, 2000; Mahoney and Roberts, 
2007; Mahoney et al., 2008; Johnson 
and Greening, 1999). 
 
Research Questions 
 
CSP: As discussed previously, there are 
significant negative economic, legal, 
reputational, and contractual conse-
quences to a financial reporting failure.  
A financial reporting failure is evidence 
that previously issued accounting reports 
were incorrect, thus creating uncertainty 
about the credibility and verifiability of 
financial reports after the reporting fail-
ure.  In response to financial reporting 
failures, studies find firms take steps to 
improve corporate governance mecha-
nisms following a fraud or restatement 
in order to restore credibility and trans-
parency in their financial reporting.  For 
example, Farber (2005) finds fraud firms 
increase the number of audit committee 
meetings and the number and percentage 
of outside board members in the three-
year period following the fraud.  LaGore 
(2008) finds restating firms significantly 
increase the number of outside directors 
on the board, the number of audit com-
mittee meetings, and the number of out-
side directors and financial experts on 
the audit committee in the three-year 
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period following a restatement an-
nouncement.  These changes in corpo-
rate governance may be mechanisms 
that constrain management’s opportunis-
tic behavior and lead to more transparent 
reporting.  However, it is unclear how 
this improvement in corporate govern-
ance following a fraud or restatement 
affects a firm’s CSP.   
 
Prior research finds a positive relation-
ship between disclosure level and CSP 
(Gelb and Strawser, 2001).  Mahoney et 
al. (2008) examine CSP and executive 
compensation before and after the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act (SOX) and find that the 
improvements in corporate governance 
required by SOX may be resulting in 
increased transparency regarding the 
measurement of CSP and an increase in 
accountability, as firms appear to be 
structuring compensation to promote 
CSP.  Gelb and Strawser (2001) also 
find that more extensive disclosures are 
provided by firms with higher CSP rat-
ings.  Given that measures of CSP tend 
to rely on publicly available information, 
it may be that firms before the restate-
ment would have been reluctant to make 
factors that are encapsulated in CSP 
weaknesses (bad news) available to the 
public.  It follows that if improvements 
in corporate governance following a re-
statement encourage revelation and 
transparency, the resulting increase in 
information available may influence 
CSP in a negative direction.  Further-
more, following the restatement period, 
firms may feel need to be more account-
able, thus influencing CSP in a positive 
direction.  However, it would be difficult 
to theoretically determine the net direc-
tional change in CSP as a result of re-
statement. Therefore, the first research 
question tested is: 
H1: CSP (Total, Product and People) 
before restatement is different than CSP 
after restatement. 
 
CSP and FP: As discussed before, em-
pirical results concerning the nature of 
the relationship, if any, between CSP 
and FP, continues to be mixed (See Grif-
fin and Mahon, 1997; Roman et al., 
1999).  Researchers have hypothesized 
and have given rational theoretical justi-
fication for negative, positive, and neu-
tral links between CSP and FP.  Wad-
dock and Graves (1997) argue that the 
fundamental reason for the uncertainty 
between the CSP and FP relationship is 
the problem of measuring CSP.  Hence, 
Waddock and Graves (1997) used the 
KLD database as an improved measure 
of CSP and found a significant relation-
ship.  Orlitzky (2008) found that there is 
an overall positive, but highly variable 
relationship between CSP and FP and 
noted that the large variability of find-
ings in previous research is party due to 
primary study artifacts.  As studies find 
financial restatements negatively affect 
firm performance and lead to increased 
uncertainty about the future profitability 
and economic prospects of restatement 
firms, it would be interesting to compare 
the association between CSP and FP 
between restating firms and non-
restating firms.  Based upon these incon-
sistencies in prior research, it is unclear 
how the negative effects of restatements 
on firm performance will impact CSP.  
Thus, since we are unable to predict a 
directional effect, the second research 
question tested is as follows: 
 
H2: The relationship between CSP and 
FP is different for restating firms than 
non-restating firms.   
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METHODS 
 
Sample Selections 
 
Data on restating firms was obtained 
from the GAO-03-395R Financial State-
ment Restatement Database for the pe-
riod of January 1, 1996 to June 30, 2002.  
Of the initial sample of 919 restating 
firms, 40 firms were eliminated because 
no ticker symbol or CNUM could be 
found.  Ninety-three firms were deleted 
because of multiple restatements.  The 
initial collection of financial data found 
that 153 firms were missing the required 
financial data.  Furthermore, 174 firms 
were missing financial data in the post-
restatement period only, 200 firms were 
missing financial data in the pre-
restatement period only, and 48 firms 
were missing financial data in both the 
pre- and post-restatement periods.  The 
missing data does not appear to be clus-
tered in either the pre- or post-
restatement period.  The number of 
firms with missing Compustat data in 
the pre-restatement period is comparable 
to the post-restatement period, with 200 
and 174 firms, respectively.  Therefore, 
approximately 63 percent (575 firms) of 
the initial restatement sample of 919 
firms did not have sufficient financial 
data from Compustat to be included in 
the final sample.  This study requires 
financial data for the two years prior to 
and the two years following the restate-
ment announcement year.  A likely ex-
planation for the loss of these firms is 
due to the fact that many restating firms 
declare bankruptcy or are delisted fol-
lowing the restatements.  This could po-
tentially lead to a survivorship bias, 
which may prevent the results from gen-
eralizing to the overall set of publicly 
traded firms.  Finally, 15 firms were 
eliminated because their returns and 
earnings data are considered outliers 
with studentized residuals greater than 
the absolute value of three.  Outliers are 
observations that are extreme or appear 
inconsistent with the remaining data.  
This resulted in a final sample of 196 
firms that had restated their financial 
statements.  Missing CSP data for two 
years prior and two years after the re-
statements reduced the final sample size 
to 44 firms.  These 44 firms were 
matched based upon SIC code to firms 
that had not restated their financial state-
ments.  Thirty-one companies were 
matched based upon the four-digit SIC 
code, five companies were matched 
based upon the last 3 digits of the SIC 
code and eight companies were matched 
based upon the last two digits of the SIC 
code.  The final sample consisted four 
years of data for 44 restating firms and 
44 non-restating firms, for a total num-
ber of 88 firms with 352 observations.  
  
The Model 
 
To test hypotheses 1, a randomized 
block design was used to determine the 
effect, if any, of restatement on the CSP.  
To test hypotheses 2, panel data analysis 
was used to examine the impact of re-
statement firms on the association be-
tween the dependent variable CSP and 
the independent variable FP (ROA) with 
firm size, firm leverage and firm indus-
try as control variables.  In order to cap-
ture omitted factors that may lead to a 
difference in CSP levels between the 
prestatement years and the postatement 
years, the indicator variable (as denoted 
by Post) is included as a separate inde-
pendent control.  Additionally, in order 
to capture the difference between restat-
ing firms and non-restating firms, the 
indicator variable (as denoted by Match) 
is also included as a separate independ-
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ent variable.  Two-factor interaction 
terms are added to the model to allow 
the effect of an independent variable on 
the dependent variable to vary by the 
level of another independent variable.  
For example, the interaction term 
ROA*Post allows the effect of ROA on 
the dependent variable CSP to differ for 
the prestatement years and the postate-
ment years.  The three-factor interaction 
term ROA*Post*Match is added to the 
model to allow the ROA*Post interac-
tion to differ between restating and non-
restating firms. Hypotheses two is tested 
through the following regression equa-
tion: 
 
  i: firm  
  t: year  
  k: 1-7 (number of SIC codes minus 
one) 
  CSP = Corporate Social Perform-
ance Score Value for Total, 
People, Product, Strengths and 
Weaknesses 
Post  = 1 if one or two years after 
restatement, 0 if otherwise 
Match  = 0 if restatement firm, 1 oth-
erwise 
ROA =Return on Assets 
Debt-to-Equity = Total Debt/Total Eq-
uity   
Industryk = 1 if industry k, 0 otherwise   
 
 
Measures 
Dependent Variables 
Measurement of CSP 
 
As prior research points out, there is no 
history of systematic social reporting 
(Gray et al., 1995) and there are no gen-
erally accepted social reporting stan-
dards (Wallage, 2000).  Because of this, 
data for empirical research on CSP origi-
nates from voluntary disclosures by 
firms or from external monitors.  The 
absence of standardized reporting is at 
least partially responsible for the mixed 
results found regarding the characteris-
tics of reporting firms, the quality of 
their reporting, and the relationship be-
tween social performance and economic 
performance (Roberts, 1992; Gray et al., 
1995). 
 
Shane and Spicer (1983) was one of the 
first published empirical studies to rely 
on externally produced ratings of CSP, 
using data developed by the U.S. Coun-
cil on Economic Priorities (CEP).  They 
argued that externally produced data was 
superior to voluntary disclosure when 
performing cross-sectional studies, stat-
ing: 
In the absence of mandated dis-
closure and reporting standards, 
voluntary disclosures tend to be 
inconsistent and non-comparable 
from firm to firm, even in the 
same industry.  On the other hand, 
externally produced data (at least 
as produced by the CEP) was 
gathered using consistent proce-
dures for collection and reporting 
across firms.  Comparisons across 
firms are thereby possible and 
potentially meaningful (p. 523). 
 
Subsequent accounting studies also 
made use of CEP ratings (e.g., Cowen et 
al., 1987; Roberts, 1992). 
CSPi,t+1 = b0 +b1ROAit + b2Matchit +  b3Postit +  b4ROA*Matchit + 
b5ROA*Postit + b6Match*Postsit + b7ROA*Post*Matchit  
+  b8Debt-to-Equityit + b9Assetsit  + b10Industrykit 
  
(1) 
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In 1994, several U.S. researchers began 
to address the major problems in CSP 
measurement by using the Kinder, 
Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) database as a 
measurement of CSP.  KLD rates over 
650 corporations traded on the U.S. 
stock exchanges on various dimensions 
considered important to social perform-
ance.  Because the KLD database was 
developed and maintained by an inde-
pendent rating service that assessed CSP 
across a range of dimensions related to 
stakeholder concerns, researchers argued 
that the KLD database brought a new 
and improved consistent measurement of 
CSP for United States companies 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997).  U.S. re-
search flourished with this new measure-
ment assessment (Graves and Waddock, 
1994; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Grif-
fin and Mahon, 1997; Bendheim et al., 
1998; Berman et al., 1999; Johnson and 
Greening, 1999; Greening and Turban, 
2000; Albinger and Freeman, 2000; Ruf 
et al., 2001).  The KLD database has 
been recognized as the best information 
available for researchers studying CSP 
in the U.S. (Hillman and Keim, 2001). 
Therefore, we use KLD’s ratings of so-
cial performance to measure CSP.   
 
Following previous research (Johnson 
and Greening, 1999; Mahoney and 
Thorne, 2005), we use several different 
measurements of CSP that consider To-
tal CSP, Total CSP Product, and Total 
CSP People across the dimensions of 
strengths and weakness.  CSP Strengths 
are positive aspects of CSP; examples 
include positive union relations, strong 
community giving, and environmental 
planning.  CSP Weaknesses are negative 
aspects of CSP; examples include safety 
problems, human rights violations, and 
environment fines.  Figure 1 summarizes 
the different measures of CSP employed 
in this study.   
 
  Total CSP Variable 
  
 CSP Strengths 
Variable 
CSP Weaknesses 
Variable 
Total CSP 
(Community, Diversity, Em-
ployee Relations, Environ-
ment, International, Product 
and Business Practices and 
Other) 
Total CSP Total CSP Product Total CSP People 
Product Dimension (Product 
and Business Practices and 
Environment) 
Total CSP Product CSP Product 
Strengths 
CSP Product 
Weaknesses 
  
People Dimension 
(Community, Diversity and 
Employee Relations 
Total CSP People CSP People 
Strengths 
CSP People 
Weaknesses 
Figure 1 
Summary of CSP Measures 
*Per Mahoney and Thorne (2005)  
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Each company is given a Total CSP rat-
ing by KLD along seven dimensions: 
community, diversity, employee rela-
tions, environment, `international, prod-
uct and business practices, and other [].  
Each of these dimensions is given a 
strength rating and a weakness rating on 
a scale of zero to two.  A rating of 0 indi-
cates no strengths or no weaknesses 
while a rating of 2 represents a major 
strength or a major weakness.  CSP 
Strengths are calculated by summing the 
strength ratings across all seven dimen-
sions for each company while CSP 
Weaknesses are calculated by summing 
the weakness ratings across all seven 
dimensions.  Finally, Total CSP is calcu-
lated by taking CSP Strengths and sub-
tracting CSP Weaknesses. 
 
Our second measure of CSP is a sub-
dimension of Total CSP: Total CSP 
Product.  Total CSP Product attempts to 
capture the extent to which a firm is 
committed to quality products and prac-
tices sound environmental policies.  For 
example, executives concerned with 
consistent returns over time may likely 
avoid the imposition of costly environ-
mental fines (Johnson and Greening, 
1999; Silverstein, 1994).  Total CSP 
Product is comprised of KLD’s product 
and business practices and environment 
dimensions that relate to product and 
service quality and to the firm’s stance 
toward the natural environment.  This 
classification is consistent with ISO 
standards that require firms to establish a 
series of management subsystems, stan-
dards, and guidelines to ensure product 
quality as well as safe and environmen-
tally responsible practices (Uzumeri, 
1997). 
 
Our third measure of CSP is a sub-
dimension of Total CSP: Total CSP Peo-
ple.  Total CSP People captures the con-
tributions firms make to communities 
through their hiring of women and mi-
norities and their treatment of employ-
ees.  Executives may interpret the costs 
of hiring minorities as unnecessary 
short-term expenses; however, they may 
recognize the long-term benefits of pro-
active employment policies when con-
sidering the long-term avoidance of 
costly fines (Mahapatra, 1984).  Further-
more, signaling theory suggests that hir-
ing underrepresented groups sends a 
positive signal regarding a firm’s reputa-
tion and legitimacy (Turban and Green-
ing, 1997).  Total CSP People is com-
posed of KLD’s dimensions of commu-
nity, employee relations, and diversity. 
 
Corporate governance would be ex-
pected to have bearing and an associa-
tion on aspects or sub-dimensions of 
CSP that could be directly impacted by 
executives’ decisions while other sub-
dimensions may be more impacted by 
the general business or cultural context 
in which a firm operates.  For example, a 
firm’s diversity may be primarily im-
pacted by the labor pool that is available, 
while its product dimensions may be 
more easily impacted by executive’s 
attention to control and safety aspects in 
product development.  In fact, previous 
research has found differential associa-
tions between some aspects of corporate 
governance and the people/product as-
pects of CSP.  For example, a positive 
relationship for U.S. firms between top 
executive equity and the total product 
dimension of CSP has been found 
(Johnson and Greening, 1999), without 
comparable associations on the people 
aspect of CSP.   
 
As discussed before, firms take steps to 
improve corporate governance mecha-
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nisms following a fraud or restatement 
in order to restore the credibility of their 
financial reports.  In addition, it is ex-
pected that corporate governance would 
have bearing and an association on as-
pects or sub-dimensions of CSP that 
could be directly impacted by execu-
tives’ decisions.  Thus it follows that 
improvements in corporate governance 
following a financial restatement may 
affect certain aspects or sub-dimensions 
of CSP, particularly those that could be 
directly affected by executive decisions. 
 
Independent Variables for Panel Data 
Analysis 
 
Following previous research, return on 
assets (ROA) was used to measure a 
firm’s FP (Waddock and Graves, 1997, 
Roman et al., 1999, Mahoney and Rob-
erts, 2007; Fauzi, et al., 2007).  Follow-
ing the works of prior research 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997; Mahoney 
and Roberts, 2007), data on CSP was 
collected for the year following the year 
ROA was reported to provide an oppor-
tunity for capturing a lag between CSP 
and FP.  Information on ROA was ob-
tained from the Compustat database.  
 
Control Variables.  Consistent with prior 
research, we control for firm size, debt 
level and industry as previous research 
noted that they may cause differences in 
FP (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Graves 
and Waddock, 1994; Mahoney and Rob-
erts, 2007).  Consistent with prior re-
search, total assets is used as a proxy for 
size of the firm (Mahoney and Roberts, 
2007; Graves and Waddock, 1994; Wad-
dock and Graves, 1997) and debt-to-
equity (Mahoney and Thorne, 2006) is 
used to represent debt level.  Informa-
tion on total assets and debt-to-equity 
are obtained from the Compustat data-
base.  Industries are represented by 
dummy variables and were broken down 
by four-digit Standard Industrial Classi-
fication (SIC) code per Graves and Wad-
dock (1994).  
 
Panel Data Models 
 
In summary, we investigate the behavior 
of CSP and its relation to FP by running 
nine separate regressions using panel 
data—three regressions using CSP as 
our dependent variable measure for To-
tal CSP, Total CSP Product, and Total 
CSP People; three regressions using 
CSP Strengths for Total CSP Strengths, 
CSP Product Strengths, and  CSP People 
Strengths and three regressions using 
CSP Weaknesses for Total CSP Weak-
nesses, CSP Product Weaknesses, and 
CSP Weaknesses, all with ROA as the 
independent variable.  
    
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
Analysis 
 
 Table 1 shows the means, standard de-
viations, and correlations for our inde-
pendent, dependent, and control vari-
ables for the entire sample consisting of 
non-restating and restatement firms.  
The means for Total CSP, CSP 
Strengths, and CSP Weaknesses are .15, 
2.99, and 2.84 respectively.  The means 
for Total CSP Product, CSP Product 
Strengths, and CSP Product Weaknesses 
are -.61, .50, and 1.11 respectively.  The 
means for Total CSP People, CSP Peo-
ple Strengths, and CSP People Weak-
nesses are 1.53, 2.39, and .86 respec-
tively.  The mean ROA is 6.07% and is 
significantly positively correlated with 
Total CSP, Total CSP Product, and Total 
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CSP People and significantly negatively 
correlated with CSP Weaknesses, CSP 
Product Weaknesses, and CSP People 
Weaknesses.  The means for debt-to-
equity is 58.05% and for assets are 
$12,357 million.  
 
Table 2 shows the means, standard de-
viations, and correlations for our inde-
pendent, dependent, and control vari-
ables for restatement firms only.  The 
means for Total CSP, CSP Strengths, 
and CSP Weaknesses are .27, 3.11, and 
2.84 respectively.  The means for Total 
CSP Product, CSP Product Strengths, 
and CSP Product Weaknesses are -.68, 
.49, and 1.18 respectively. The means 
for Total CSP People, CSP People 
Strengths, and CSP People Weaknesses 
are 1.69, 2.49, and .80 respectively.  The 
mean ROA is 5.48% and is significantly 
positively correlated with Total CSP and 
Total CSP Product and significantly 
negatively correlated with CSP Product 
Weaknesses.  The mean debt-to-equity is 
59.7% and the mean assets are $11,000 
million. 
 
Table 3 shows the means, standard de-
viations, and correlations for our inde-
pendent, dependent, and control vari-
ables for non-restating firms only.  The 
means for Total CSP, CSP Strengths, 
and CSP Weaknesses are .03, 2.87, and 
2.84 respectively.  The means for Total 
CSP Product, CSP Product Strengths, 
and CSP Product Weaknesses are -.55, 
.51, and 1.05 respectively.  The means 
for Total CSP People, CSP People 
Strengths, and CSP People Weaknesses 
are 1.37, 2.28, and .91 respectively.  The 
mean ROA is 6.64%.  Similar to non-
restating firms, ROA is significantly 
positively correlated with Total CSP and 
Total CSP Product and significantly 
negatively correlated with CSP Product 
Weaknesses.  Unlike non-restating 
firms, ROA for restatement firms is also 
significantly positively related to Total 
CSP People and CSP People Strengths 
along with being significantly negatively 
related to CSP Weaknesses and CSP 
People Weaknesses.  Additionally, the 
mean debt-to-equity is 56.4 % and the 
mean assets are $13,713 million for non-
restating firms.  Overall, restatement 
firms tend to have a higher level of Total 
CSP, CSP Strengths, and CSP People 
Strengths and CSP Weaknesses while 
non-restatement firms have a higher 
level of CSP People Strengths and CSP 
Product Weaknesses. 
 
Hypothesis 1  
 
To test hypothesis 1 a randomized block 
design, equivalent to a paired t-test, was 
used to determine the effect, if any, of a 
restatement on Total CSP, CSP 
Strengths, and CSP Weaknesses; Total 
CSP Product, CSP Product Strengths, 
and CSP Product Weaknesses; and Total 
CSP People, CSP People Strengths, and 
CSP People Weaknesses.  The depend-
ent variable consisted of CSP scores 
which were compared at different time 
periods, i.e., one year before and after 
restatement and two years before and 
after restatement.  Table 4 summarizes 
the average Total, Strengths, and Weak-
nesses CSP scores for these time periods 
and indicates which differences are sta-
tistically significant.  Note that the aver-
age total for a score is equal to the dif-
ference between the corresponding aver-
age strength and average weakness. 
 
Most of the significant differences are 
found by looking at two years before 
and two years after restatement.  CSP 
Strengths and CSP Weaknesses signifi-
cantly increased at p<.01 in the period 
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following restatement though CSP 
Weaknesses increased by a greater 
amount than CSP Strengths.  This sig-
nificance appears to be driven by the 
People dimensions of CSP as both CSP 
People Strengths and CSP People Weak-
nesses significantly increased at p<.01.  
Also, CSP People Weaknesses increased 
by a greater amount than CSP People 
Strengths.  When looking at one year 
before and one year after restatement, 
we do find that Total CSP significantly 
decreased and CSP Weaknesses signifi-
cantly increased at p<.01.  Additionally, 
Total CSP Product significantly de-
creased at p<.05.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
 
Because we have cross-sectional and 
time series data, we used panel data 
analyses to further investigate the 
change in CSP and test hypothesis two.  
In all equations, size, debt-to-equity ra-
tio, and industry were included as con-
trol variables.  Consistent with prior lit-
erature, a one-year lag between the FP 
variable and the dependent and control 
variables was used.   
 
Table 5 presents the results of our three 
panel data regressions that include Total 
CSP, CSP Strengths, and CSP Weakness 
as our dependent variable and ROA as 
our independent variable.  For Total 
CSP, similar to the results found in the 
randomized block design, the Post vari-
able was significantly negatively related 
at p<.05, indicating that CSP signifi-
cantly declined for all firms in the two 
years following the restatement period.  
For the regression with CSP Strengths as 
the independent variable, we found that 
the Post variable was significantly posi-
Dependent One Year Two Years 
Variable Before After Difference Before After Difference 
              
Total CSP 0.523 -0.136    0.659** 0.545   0.136    0.409 
CSP Strengths 3.068 3.114   -0.045 2.773 3.477   -0.705** 
CSP Weaknesses 2.545 3.250  -0.705** 2.227 3.341 -1.114** 
              
Total CSP Product -0.614 -0.841   0.227* -0.591  -0.682 0.091 
CSP Product 
Strengths 
0.500 0.477 0.023 0.477 0.523    -0.046 
CSP Product Weak-
nesses 
1.114 1.318    -0.205 1.068 1.205    -0.136 
              
Total CSP People 1.773 1.636     0.136 1.705 1.636     0.068 
CSP People Strengths 2.455 2.523    -0.068 2.205 2.773    -0.568** 
CSP People Weak-
nesses 
0.682 0.886    -0.205 0.500 1.136    -0.636** 
Table 4 
Restating Firms Average CSP, Product, and People Scores for One  
and Two Year Time Periods  
*p<.05    
**p<.01  
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tively related at p<.05 indicating that 
CSP Strengths are higher after the re-
statement period for all firms, which is 
consistent with our results found in the 
randomized block design.  Additionally, 
we found the interaction term of 
Match*Post was significantly negatively 
at p< .01.  As shown in Figure 2, though 
CSP Strengths increased for all firms 
after the restatement period the increase 
was higher for restatement firms than 
non-restatement firms, suggesting that 
restatement firms may be more account-
able after the period of restatement by 
managing their CSP Strengths.  The in-
teraction term of ROA*Match is signifi-
cantly negatively related at p<.01 indi-
cating that the effect of ROA on CSP 
Strengths is greater for restatement firms 
than non-restating firms, supporting hy-
pothesis 2.  The interaction term of 
ROA*Post*Match was significantly 
positively related to CSP Strengths at 
p<.01 indicating that the effect of ROA 
on CSP Strengths also varies in the peri-
ods prior and after restatement.  For the 
regression using CSP Weaknesses as the 
dependent variable, we found the Post 
variable was significantly positively re-
lated at p<.01, indicating that for all 
firms the average CSP Weakness in-
creased in the period following the re-
statement. These results are also consis-
tent with our findings in the randomized 
block design.  Also the interaction term 
of Match*Post was significantly nega-
tively related at p<.05.  As shown in Fig-
ure 3, restatement firms had a greater 
increase in CSP Weaknesses than non-
restatement firms.  This is consistent 
with increased transparency following 
the restatement period as more negative 
information concerning the firm is made 
available.   
 
Table 6 presents the results of our three 
Dependent Total CSP CSP Strengths CSP Weakness 
              
Independent             
  ROA -.015 .025 .009 .016 .025 .018 
  Match .293 .669 .483 .498 .184 .431 
  Post -.653 .272* .396 .180* 1.053 .195** 
  ROA*Match -.074 .039 -.084 .026** -.009 .028 
  ROA*Post .024 .034 -.012 .023 -.038 .025 
  Match*Post -.426 .400 -1.124 .266** -.732 .286* 
  ROA*Post*Match .073 .046 .103 .031** .032 .033 
Control             
   Debt-to-Equity -.184 1.169 .609 .804 1.009 .802 
   Assets -.001 .000 .001 .000** .001 .000** 
R2   .151   .284   .464 
Wald chi-square   40.3**   66.8**   133.46** 
Panel data model type             
Number of Firms   88   88   88 
Number of Observations   352   352   352 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
Table 5 
Coefficient (Standard Error) of Panel Data Analysis for CSP Using a One Year 
Lag between the Dependent Variable and Independent Variables 
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panel data regressions that include Total 
CSP Product, CSP Product Strengths, 
and CSP Product Weakness as our de-
pendent variable and ROA as our inde-
pendent variable.  For Total CSP Prod-
uct, we found no significant relation-
ships.  For the regression with CSP 
Product Strengths as the dependent vari-
able, we found that the interaction term 
of Match*Post was significantly nega-
tively related at p<.05.  As shown in Fig-
ure 4, restatement firms showed a slight 
increase in CSP Product Strengths in the 
period following restatement while non-
Dependent Total CSP Product CSP Product 
Strengths 
CSP Product Weak-
ness 
              
Independent             
  ROA -.009 .011 -.004 .005 .005 .009 
  Match .219 .319 .066 .152 -.155 .297 
  Post -.181 .118 .026 .057 .206 .104* 
  ROA*Match -.003 .017 -.000 .008 .004 .015 
  ROA*Post .010 .015 -.005 .007 -.015 .013 
  Match*Post .057 .174 -.168 .083* -.218 .153 
  ROA*Post*Match -.004 .020 .009 .010 .013 .018 
Control             
   Debt-to-Equity -.306 .522 -.132 .250 .124 .467 
   Assets -.001 .000** .001 .000 .001 .000** 
R2   .3363   .177   .407 
Wald chi-square   62.72**   26.26**   74.52** 
Panel data model type             
Number of Firms   88   88   88 
Number of Observations   352   352   352 
Table 6 
Coefficient (Standard Error) of Panel Data Analysis for CSP Using a One Year 
Lag between the Dependent Variable and Independent Variables 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
restatement firms showed a decrease.  
Again, suggesting that restatement firms 
may be more accountable after the pe-
riod of restatement and managing their 
CSP Product Strengths.  For the regres-
sion using CSP Product Weaknesses as 
the dependent variable, only the Post 
term was significantly positively related 
at p<.05 indicating that CSP Product 
Weaknesses increased for all firms in the 
period following the restatement.   
 
Table 7 presents the results of our three 
panel data regressions that include Total 
CSP People, CSP People Strengths, and 
CSP People Weakness as our dependent 
variable and ROA as our independent 
variable.  For our regression with Total 
CSP People, the interaction term of 
ROA*Match is significantly negatively 
related at p<.01 indicating that the effect 
of ROA on Total CSP People is greater 
for restatement firms than non-restating 
firms, supporting hypothesis 2.  The in-
teraction term of ROA*Post*Match is 
also significantly positively related to 
Total CSP People at p<.01 indicating 
that the effect of ROA on CSP Strengths 
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also varies in the periods prior and after 
restatement.  The interaction term of 
Match*Post is significantly negatively 
related at p<.05.  Per figure 5, restate-
ment firms had a bigger decrease in To-
tal CSP People after restatement than 
non-restatement firms.  For the regres-
sion using CSP People Strengths as the 
dependent variable, we found that the 
Post variable is significantly positively 
related at p>.05 indicating that for all 
firms CSP People Strengths significantly 
increased in the two years following the 
restatement period.  We also found that 
the interaction term of ROA*Match is 
significantly negatively related at p<.01, 
indicating that the effect of ROA on 
CSP People Strengths is greater for re-
statement firms than non-restating firms, 
supporting hypothesis 2.  The interaction 
term of ROA*Post*Match is also sig-
nificantly positively related to CSP Peo-
ple Strengths at p<.01, indicating that 
the effect of ROA on CSP People 
Strengths also varies in the periods prior 
and after restatement.  The interaction 
term of Match*Post is significantly 
negatively related at p<.05.  Per figure 6, 
restatement firms had a bigger increase 
in CSP People Strengths after restate-
ment than non-restatement firms, again 
suggesting the restatement firms may be 
more accountable in the period follow-
ing restatement by focusing in on CSP 
strengths.  For our CSP People Weak-
nesses regression, the only significant 
variable that we found was the Post vari-
able at p<.01, indicating that for all 
firms CSP People Weaknesses signifi-
cantly increased in the two years follow-
ing the restatement period.   
       
 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION  
 
This study was undertaken to investigate 
CSP in restatement firms along with in-
vestigating the relationship of CSP to FP 
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for these same firms.  Consistent with 
prior research on accountability and dis-
closure (Mahoney et al., 2008), we 
found Total CSP after restatement of 
earnings was significantly lower than the 
average Total CSP before restatement.  
In particular, even though CSP Strengths 
increased, it was offset by a greater in-
crease in CSP Weaknesses.  This in-
crease in strengths may be due to the 
efforts by the firms to be accountable 
and improve the reputation of the firm.  
However, this may have been offset by 
the negative impact of transparency sur-
rounding financial restatement.  These 
findings support hypothesis 1 for Total 
CSP which differs before and after re-
statement.  
 
We also compared restatement firms 
with matched non-restating firms in our 
panel data analysis.  We found that CSP 
Strengths, CSP Weaknesses, and CSP 
People Strengths for restatement firms 
showed a greater increase than non-
restatement firms.  For Total CSP Peo-
ple, we found that restatement firms 
showed a greater decrease than non-
restatement firms.  For CSP Product 
Strengths, we found that while restate-
ment firms increased slightly, non-
restating firms showed a significant de-
crease.  These findings are consistent 
with prior research on reporting failure 
that show that restating firms take steps 
to improve corporate governance mecha-
nisms following restatement in order to 
restore credibility and transparency 
Dependent Total CSP People CSP People 
Strengths 
CSP People Weak-
ness 
              
Independent             
  ROA .021 .018 .015 .014 -.006 .011 
  Match .268 .446 .431 .394 .214 .202 
  Post -.042 .197 .324 .153* .378 .128** 
  ROA*Match -.093 .028** -.084 .022** .001 .018 
  ROA*Post -.015 .025 -.007 .019 .005 .016 
  Match*Post -.715 .290* -.881 .225** -.212 .188 
  OA*Post*Match .107 .034** .093 .026** -.010 .022 
Control             
   Debt-to-Equity .213 .821 .793 .668 .576 .419 
   Assets .001 .000* .001 .000** .001 .000** 
R2   .166   .283   .203 
Wald chi-square   41.06**   80.66*   54.03** 
Panel data model type             
Number of Firms   88   88   88 
Number of Observa-
tions   352   352   352 
Table 7 
Coefficient (Standard Error) of Panel Data Analysis for CSP Using a One Year 
Lag between the Dependent Variable and Independent Variables 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
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(Farber, 2005; LaGore, 2008) and pro-
vide addition support for hypothesis 1. 
 
We also find support for hypothesis 2, 
since a stronger positive relationship 
exists between ROA on CSP Strengths 
for restatement firms than non-restating 
firms.  In particular, we find that this 
effect is a result of the People dimension 
of CSP with significant relationships for 
Total CSP People and CSP People 
Strengths while no relationship was 
found for any dimension of CSP Prod-
uct.  These results provide further sup-
port for the previous literature on the 
positive relationship between CSP and 
FP and that CSP and FP may be mutu-
ally reinforcing organizational activities 
(Orlitzky, 2008). 
 
Like all research, ours has limitations 
associated with the measures, methodol-
ogy and sample size.  The use of KLD 
ratings to measure CSP are questionable 
(Chatterji and Levine, 2006; Chatterji, et 
al., forthcoming; Orlitzky and Swanson, 
2008; Porter and Kramer, 2006) since 
they are determined by an independent 
firm and are the result of Kinder, Lyden-
berg, Domini Research & Analytics’ 
definition and evaluations of CSP.  Pre-
vious research has found that while KLD 
weakness ratings are a good summary of 
past environmental performance, KLD 
strengths do not accurately predict pollu-
tion levels or compliance violations 
(Chatterji et al., forthcoming).  Research 
has also found that KLD is not optimally 
using publicly available data (Chatterji 
et al., forthcoming).  Furthermore, the 
equal weighting and content of each di-
mension of CSP is another limitation 
(Chatterji and Levine, 2006).  Future 
research on the investigation of the con-
struction validity of KLD, the impact of 
equal weighting of dimension and cri-
tiques of KLD’s perspective on CSP 
would aid in the development of this 
research stream.  
 
The sample selection bias is also a po-
tential alternative explanation of the re-
sults.  There are some possible selection 
biases in our final sample of restatement 
firms since the research design requires 
each sample firm to have data for a con-
secutive 5-year period, the two years 
before and after the restatement an-
nouncement.  Thus, the final sample 
tends to include surviving and larger 
firms that may be perceived as more re-
liable.  Therefore, the external validity 
of the study may be in question as the 
results may not generalize to the overall 
population of publicly traded companies.  
On the other hand, larger firms receive 
more media coverage and regulatory 
attention than smaller firms and there-
fore may be under more pressure to 
change financial reporting and corporate 
social performance following a restate-
ment in order to restore the public’s trust 
in their financial reporting.  The results 
of this analysis are encouraging because 
the prospect of a positive CSP and FP 
ownership links means that even restate-
ment firms can be socially responsible 
and financially successful following the 
period of restatement.   
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